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Abstract
We explore a new mechanism to explain polarization phenomena in opinion dynamics in which agents
evaluate alternative views on the basis of the social feedback obtained on expressing them. High support
of the favored opinion in the social environment, is treated as a positive feedback which reinforces the
value associated to this opinion. In connected networks of sufficiently high modularity, different groups
of agents can form strong convictions of competing opinions. Linking the social feedback process to
standard equilibrium concepts we analytically characterize sufficient conditions for the stability of bi-
polarization. While previous models have emphasized the polarization effects of deliberative argument-
based communication, our model highlights an affective experience-based route to polarization, without
assumptions about negative influence or bounded confidence.
1 Introduction
The public discourse around political polarization has regained momentum in the recent past.
The fundamental divide between Democrats and Republicans in the United States and the
rise of nationalistic voices in the European sphere reflect fundamental differences in attitudes
and ideas regarding the »right« direction to go and have engaged the interest of investigators
in social network science because it is a hard problem to model. With this paper we aim to
identify mechanisms and conditions for the emergence of polarization. Polarization refers either
to a distribution of opinions with multiple local maxima or to the process by which such strong
divergences of opinions that divide a population come about (DiMaggio et al., 1996; Bramson
et al., 2016). The challenge has been to develop an explanation of polarization with mathematical
or computational models of opinion dynamics (French Jr, 1956; Abelson, 1964; DeGroot, 1974;
Chatterjee and Seneta, 1977; Friedkin and Johnsen, 1990; Deffuant et al., 2000; Hegselmann
et al., 2002). We propose a very basic reinforcement learning mechanism that leads to the
emergence and persistence of stable patterns of bi-polarization even if the interaction network
that encodes the patterns of social influence is strongly connected. With this mechanism, the
paper provides a parsimonious answer to Abelson’s old question of »what on earth one must
assume in order to generate the bimodal outcome of community cleavage studies« (Abelson, 1964,
p. 153). In contrast to some previous models of opinion bi-polarization, our approach does not
rely on negative social influence (Mark, 2003; Macy et al., 2003; Baldassarri and Bearman, 2007;
Flache and Macy, 2011) or on notions of opinion homophily and bounded confidence (Axelrod,
1997; Deffuant et al., 2000; Hegselmann et al., 2002; Mäs and Flache, 2013; Duggins, 2017), but
on a simple reinforcement mechanism that has not yet been explored in the context of opinion
and polarization dynamics.
The main idea is that individuals express their opinion about an issue and are sensitive to ap-
proval and disapproval by their peers (Homans, 1974). Agreement leads to a positive experience
which strengthens attachment to the expressed opinion. Conversely, disagreement is assumed to
be related to a negative sentiment and decreases attachment to the current opinion. In a wide
range of interaction networks with sufficiently high modularity this reinforcement leads to the
formation of different opinion clusters in which agents become collectively more and more com-
mitted to their cluster’s opinion. The process we propose can be seen as an abstraction from
recent models of polarization that rely on ideas from argument persuasion (Dandekar et al.,
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2013; Mäs and Flache, 2013). However, our model comes with another connotation as the opin-
ion change process is not assumed to involve argument processing but more elementary responses
that are mediated by the positive (negative) experience that agreement (disagreement) brings
about.
Although this mechanism is derived as a plausible heuristic motivated by psychological re-
search on implicit processes of attitude change (Fazio, 2001; Fazio et al., 2004), its formaliza-
tion is highly compatible with a subjective and procedural notion of rationality (Simon, 1978;
Goldthorpe, 1998). It gives rise to a reward-driven reinforcement learning scheme that is psy-
chologically plausible yet minimal. In the course of the process, agents internalize the expected
opinion in their neighborhood and learn to associate values to the different opinion expressions
that converge to the payoffs in the corresponding »opinion game«. This means that classical
equilibrium concepts can be applied to characterize the stable macroscopic outcomes of the opin-
ion formation process. This bridge from a rather basic process of opinion formation to a setting
where game-theoretic tools become applicable is one of the main contributions of the present
paper.
While early models of social influence (French Jr, 1956; Abelson, 1964; DeGroot, 1974; Chatterjee
and Seneta, 1977) as well as more recent applications of this paradigm (Friedkin and Johnsen,
1990; Friedkin, 1999; Friedkin et al., 2016) allow for analytical treatment, analytical solutions are
difficult to obtain if non-linearities such as bounded confidence (Deffuant et al., 2000; Hegselmann
et al., 2002) or continuous forms of opinion-dependent interaction weights (Mäs and Flache, 2013;
Duggins, 2017) are introduced (cf. Hegselmann et al. (2002) and Flache and Macy (2011)).
Consequently, new approaches to the modeling of opinion bi-polarization that generally come
with non-linear extensions to produce the desired behavior rely on agent-based simulations to
explore the model behavior. In this paper, we also use simulations to illustrate that opinion
bi-polarization is possible – indeed likely – by the social feedback account. One main objective
of the computational experiments, however, is to explore and validate the connection from a
plausible social feedback mechanism to game-theoretic notions of equilibrium through the use
of reinforcement learning. Once this connection is established, the concept of cohesion as used
in social network analysis (Wasserman and Faust, 1994) and adopted in the theory of games on
networks (Morris, 2000; Jackson and Zenou, 2014) provides a precise structural condition for
the stability of bi-polarization in heterogeneous networks.
The incorporation of ideas from reinforcement learning in the context of opinion dynamics
bears great potential as a new modeling paradigm. It differs fundamentally from most previous
modeling approaches in conceiving the articulation of an opinion as a communication act that
reflects but does not directly correspond to an agent’s attitudinal evaluation of an issue. While,
in this paper, the decision of what opinion to express is based on an agent’s conviction that its
opinion is approved by peers, the framework is general enough to incorporate situational factors
as well as strategic considerations that may be involved in opinion statements. It assumes that
agents express their opinions in their social environment and that peers may respond to this
communication in different ways. These responses provide feedback to the sender and sometimes,
in some media settings, the sheer number of responses provides a valuable reward. Implicitly or
explicitly, these rewards lead to a re-evaluation of the expression that has triggered the responses
which will affect the future behavior of that agent. This framework, therefore, may shift the
explanatory focus from forms of social influence (e.g. strong versus weak or positive versus
negative) to the incentives and rewards of opinion expression in different social settings.
The opinion polarization model we devise and analyze throughout this paper is a first illus-
tration of this more general program. We focus on dyadic interaction events constrained by a
time-homogeneous network and show that the existence of cohesive subgroups (Wasserman and
Faust, 1994; Morris, 2000) is sufficient to generate stable bi-polarization even if the subgroups
are connected. On the other hand, this simple model shows that very basic social feedback
mechanisms may be involved in processes by which an initially moderate population polarizes
into two camps which strongly support opposing views and its formulation in terms of reinforce-
ment learning and game theory provides a new account of polarization processes that can be
studied using analytical tools. With regard to more recent proposals to model bi-polarization,
our model comes with a minimal set of individual-level assumptions and does, most notably,
not rely on opinion homophily or bounded confidence by which interaction probabilities depend
on opinion similarity. In that sense, our model identifies a previously unseen combination of
mechanisms that can explain the emergence and stability of bi-polarization.
There are two basic properties that – in combination – lead to the emergence and persistence of
bi-polarization in the proposed model. On the one hand, the reinforcement mechanism gives rise
to a group polarization process by which a densely connected group initially inclined into one
attitudinal direction becomes more extreme in interaction. See, for instance, Sunstein (2002) for
a review of ample empirical evidence on this phenomena. On the other hand, the model exhibits
»gate keeping« such that opinions do not spread across structural holes (Burt, 2004) in between
different communities which prevents a single opinion to spread over the entire network. We
focus on these two properties and their interplay in Section 5.
In the presentation of our approach we proceed in the following way. In Section 2 we re-
view the field of opinion dynamics with a special focus on recent approaches to model opinion
bi-polarization. We describe our model in Section 3 and provide all the details on the imple-
mentation to allow for the reproduction of the results. In Section 4 we take a macroscopic and
a microscopic perspective to analyze model realizations on random geometric graphs (Penrose,
2003; Dall and Christensen, 2002) in order to illustrate how the mechanism leads to stable po-
larization. Section 5 is devoted to the mathematical analysis of the model and establishes the
fact that the learning scheme approaches the corresponding »opinion game« in the course of a
simulation. We show that the model leads to a group polarization process by which opinions
become extreme in densely connected groups and that structural holes prevent a single opinion
to spread over the entire network. We then focus on a two-community setting to provide a more
specific account of how the interplay of these two properties leads to polarization. In Section 6
we draw a conclusion on the paper as a whole and discuss the implications of combining opinion
dynamics with reinforcement learning for future research.
2 Modeling Opinion Polarization
Modeling opinion bi-polarization is recently receiving considerable attention in the opinion dy-
namics community. In the last few years, a series of possible interaction mechanisms have been
proposed by which a population polarizes and approaches a state with a bi-polar opinion distri-
bution (Macy et al., 2003; Baldassarri and Bearman, 2007; Flache and Macy, 2011; Dandekar
et al., 2013; Mäs and Flache, 2013; Mäs and Bischofberger, 2015; Friedkin, 2015; Duggins, 2017)
and researchers have started to assess the relevance of these competing explanatory variants
through experiments (Moussaïd et al., 2013; Chacoma and Zanette, 2015; Takács et al., 2016).
The comparison of different models in terms of experimentally-founded microscopic assumptions
on the one hand and their capabilities to generate plausible macroscopic outcomes on the other
is actually a quite remarkable scientific program as it aims at an empirical justification of rather
different links in the explanatory chain (Hedström and Ylikoski, 2010).
A major motivation for such a mechanism-based approach to polarization has been the fact that
most early models of opinion dynamics lead to either consensus or disagreeing opinions that are
not polarized. These social influence models (French Jr, 1956; Abelson, 1964; DeGroot, 1974;
Friedkin and Johnsen, 1990) are generally based on mechanisms of iterated weighted averaging
by which people’s views on an issue tend to become more similar1. Classic models (French Jr,
1956; Abelson, 1964; DeGroot, 1974) do not entail the possibility to generate persistent bi-
1See (Takács et al., 2016) for a recent experimental confirmation of opinion assimilation
polarization in a strongly connected (irreducible) network (cf. Dandekar et al. (2013)) even if
the opinion space becomes arbitrarily complex (DeGroot, 1974; Chatterjee and Seneta, 1977).
Within this linear class of models, persistent diversity may be achieved by the introduction of
stubborn agents that, to a certain degree, are attached to their initial opinion. In the mod-
els devised by Friedkin, Johnsen and co–workers (Friedkin, 1999; Friedkin and Johnsen, 2011;
Friedkin, 2015; Parsegov et al., 2017) this is modeled by an inhomogeneous term in the social
influence system that balances the importance assigned to the initial opinion against the effects
of the social influence process. By defining the patterns of mutual influence and persistence of
initial opinions appropriately, this framework has proven quite productive in generating a wide
range of macro outcomes such as choice shifts (Friedkin, 1999) and most recently the evolution of
belief systems (Parsegov et al., 2017; Friedkin et al., 2016). If individual susceptibilities depend
on the initial opinions even a bimodal opinion distribution may be a stable outcome of a linear
averaging process (Friedkin, 2015).
We note that global agreement is also the outcome of most socio-physics models of social dynam-
ics which – based on an analogy to simple spin systems (Ising, 1925) – often conceive opinions as
a binary variable (e.g. »yes« versus »no«) on which agents agree in interaction (e.g. by copying).
There is a huge body of literature devoted to the analysis of the statistical properties of systems
in which agents connected in a network exchange binary opinions and we refer to (Castellano
et al., 2009) for a review (but see, for instance, Frachebourg and Krapivsky (1996); Slanina and
Lavicka (2003); Sood and Redner (2005); Galam (2008); Banisch et al. (2012); Gleeson (2013) as
well as Moran (1958); Kimura and Weiss (1964); Clifford and Sudbury (1973) for predecessors in
theoretical biology). As long as no noise (Carro et al., 2016) or anti-conformism (Galam, 2004)
is added to the system, the opinion imitation mechanism leads to global agreement whenever
the interaction network is connected, because under this conditions the dynamics give rise to a
random walk with absorbing boundaries (Banisch, 2014b, 2016).
The approach taken in this paper can be seen as a combination of physics-inspired binary opinion
dynamics and social influence models. Agents are allowed to express two alternative opinions
(binary choice) but evolve a private evaluation of these alternatives that takes continuous values.
Despite the fact that this combination can account for the emergence and persistence of bi-
polarization even if the interaction network consists of one connected component, it also leads
to microscopically more plausible opinion change dynamics with respect to socio-physics models
as agents do not constantly switch back and forth between the two opinions but may go through
phases of confidence and indecision (see Fig. 4).
The first generation of previous opinion dynamics models which try to address the issue of stable
opinion plurality are based on the continuous social influence models and include further con-
straints, most prominently, assumptions about value or opinion homophily (McPherson et al.,
2001). In the opinion dynamics context this type of homophily refers to the fact that similar
views may lead to attraction and an increasing likeliness of interaction. Paired with positive
social influence it describes a process of repeated influence events by which »similarity leads
to interaction and interaction leads to still more similarity« (Banisch et al., 2010, 109). In the
classical models with bounded confidence (Hegselmann et al., 2002; Deffuant et al., 2000) this
is implemented via a threshold mechanism that switches off influence if the opinion discrepancy
exceeds a certain threshold. In relation to linear social influence models, this effectively means
that the matrix of social influences A is a function of the opinions that agents hold which may
disintegrate into disconnected groups of influence due to the threshold mechanism. This proce-
dural disintegration into disconnected influence groups is necessary for persistent disagreement
in this class of models.
Also the influential model by Axelrod (1997) achieves global polarization by mechanisms of local
convergence due to an homophily mechanism that disables mutual influence if the individuals
become too different. In his multi-dimensional model, the interaction probability depends on the
opinion overlap (i.e. the number of traits the two agents already share) and vanishes if agents are
unaligned on all dimensions. Unlike in other models with a multidimensional representation of
opinions (Lorenz, 2007; Banisch et al., 2010; Mäs and Flache, 2013), the Axelrod model relies on a
spatial embedding in form of a lattice that shares certain similarities with the random geometric
graph model we use in Section 4 to illustrate our results. This model gives rise to a number of
spatial clusters of agents with aligned opinions and these configurations of homogeneous regions
become stable as the overlap across regions and consequently the probability of cross–cutting
assimilation vanishes. When run on a spatial topology, our model also gives rise to spatial
clusters of opinions, but the interaction probabilities are not affected by this such that agents at
the interface between different clusters are still exposed to non-confirming feedback. The social
feedback process stabilizes because the locally prevailing opinion is more often reinforced in the
interaction with peers. Therefore, while cultural drift or communication errors implemented
as small random perturbations are »eroding the borders« (Centola et al., 2007, p.907) between
culturally stable regions in the cultural dissemination model (Klemm et al., 2003) , the interfaces
between different opinion clusters are stable with respect to noise in the social feedback model
where such perturbations occur naturally through exploration.
Bounded confidence can lead to a stable co-existence of a plurality of opinions in a popula-
tion. However, unless »extreme« agents are artificially inserted (Deffuant et al., 2002), bounded
confidence models cannot drive a population into the extremes or lead to the emergence of an-
tagonistic opinion groups as the opinion averaging procedure always locally reduces diversity.
It crucially depends on the initial opinion diversity whether or not multiple opinions survive
and the model will always end up with final opinions that are more moderate than the initial
extremes.
The recent approaches to modeling polarization dynamics introduce new mechanisms of opinion
exchange and influence in addition to positive influence and homophily. They have been classified
into models that rely on the assumption of negative social influence and models that draw upon
ideas from persuasion theory (cf. Mäs and Bischofberger (2015)). An alternative introduced in
the physics literature on opinion dynamics differentiates between a continuous internal opinion
and discrete opinion expression (Martins, 2008). We will briefly describe all three variants here.
The first branch of models seeks an explanation of polarization patterns by assuming a negative
social influence in the interaction of distant agents such that the encounter and communication
of two agents with very different views leads them to adopt even more distant positions in the
opinion space (Mark, 2003; Macy et al., 2003; Baldassarri and Bearman, 2007; Flache and Macy,
2011). Despite the possibility to generate stable polarization patterns driving the population into
two maximally extreme clusters, a recent experimental study found no indication for negative
influence of this kind (Takács et al., 2016).2 It is noteworthy that the combination of positive
and negative social influence can lead to polarization but that this feature disappears in the
presence of opinion homophily (Mäs and Bischofberger, 2015).
The second type of models capable of explaining polarization is based on psychological work
on persuasion and attitude change (Fishbein, 1963; Lord et al., 1979; Petty et al., 1981; Ajzen,
2001). Persuasion models generally assume that communication partners exchange arguments
about the object on which an attitude is formed and that new arguments are learned from
an interaction partner if they are in support of an agents view. The model by Mäs and Flache
(2013) is based on an explicit representation of attitudes borrowed from expectancy-value theory
which treats an attitude as a weighted combination of a set of pro- and con-arguments regarding
certain aspects of the issue under discussion (see also Urbig and Malitz (2005) for an early
related model). Their so-called »argument-communication theory of bi-polarization« posits a
mechanism for the co-evolution of arguments and the associated weights with the latter encoding
a limited capacity to process all arguments at once. That is, only a subset of arguments is
2The experiment was indicative of a negative influence only when people held very similar opinions, which
can be seen as a tendency to individualization. Assumptions in line with this finding have been investigated in,
for instance, Banisch (2010) and Mäs et al. (2010).
considered to be relevant and recently discussed issues play a more important role. At each time
step, two agents are chosen at random with a probability that is proportional to the similarity
of their attitudes (opinion homophily). In the interaction, the first agent adopts a randomly
chosen argument from its interaction partner (positive social influence). The larger homophily,
the more likely an agent with a similar opinion will be selected as interaction partner. As the
similarity in attitudes of both agents may come about by different subsets of arguments (those
that are currently relevant), the focal agent is likely to receive an argument in favor of his own
attitude from that partner. As a result, the model leads to a process where agents with a similar
attitude mutually reinforce that attitude by the exchange of supportive arguments.3
The model proposed in Mäs and Flache (2013) operationalizes a deliberative argument-based
route to polarization in line with the persuasive argument theory described in the seminal paper
on group polarization by Sunstein (2002). Sunstein reviews experimental evidence on group
polarization and choice shifts through group discussions and debates on its political and insti-
tutional implications. His argument is that groups inclined to a certain attitudinal direction
rely on a limited argument pool which is biased into the respective direction as there is a dis-
proportionate number of supporting claims. As arguments are exchanged the group members
acquire new arguments that tend to speak even more in favor of the initial direction. In the
Mäs/Flache model such biased and limited argument pools come about by an increased interac-
tion probability of agents which already hold similar attitudes leading to enclaves of individuals
with similar and every time more extreme inclinations. It is worth noting that such a persuasive
argument account is also in agreement with the functional approach to argumentative reasoning
put forth by Mercier and Sperber (2011), who, however, put more weight on the intuitive sources
of attitudes and supporting arguments. The learning process described in the present paper is
potentially more related to such an account. In particular, it resonates well with the paradigm
of automatic (implicit) attitude activation and the learning of evaluative associations put forth
by Fazio and colleagues (Fazio, 2001; Fazio et al., 2004).
Another persuasion-based proposal to the modeling of bi-polarization has been made by Dan-
dekar et al. (2013) who base their argument on the work of Lord et al. (1979) on biased as-
similation. The principle idea is that people who are very convinced of their view tend »to
accept "confirming" evidence at face value while subjecting "disconfirming" evidence to critical
evaluation« (p. 2098). This is sometimes also referred to as confirmation bias. Unlike the
model described above, Dandekar et al. (2013) take an abstract perspective in terms of opin-
ion representation and include biased argument evaluation into the classic repeated averaging
model (DeGroot, 1974) which operates on a single continuous opinion dimension (oi ∈ [0, 1]).
A bias function is introduced that decides about strength and direction of opinion change as a
function of the current conviction of one or the other view (the extremes 0 and 1 are interpreted
as two opposing opinions on an issue). The model contains DeGroot’s averaging process as a
limiting case and Dandekar et al. (2013) shows that there is a critical bias level at which the
process becomes polarizing. Noteworthy, polarization may occur even in the absence of opinion
homophily.
A third mechanism capable of producing a bimodal opinion distribution has been proposed by
Martins (2008). The model originated from physics-inspired models where agents face binary
choices and update their opinion by imitation of their neighbors which generally leads to all
agents holding the same opinion. The main idea of Martins (2008) is to introduce an internal
opinion that encodes how many encounters are needed for an agent to change opinion. That
is, whenever an agent observes another one expressing the same opinion, the internal opinion is
3It is worth noticing that there is a branch in theoretical biology which proposed very similar mechanisms to
model sympatric speciation (bimodal distribution of phenotypes) by assortative mating (individuals preferentially
mate with similar individuals). See (Kondrashov and Shpak, 1998) and references therein. Some aspects of the
relation between these models and models of opinion dynamics have been discussed in (Banisch, 2016, Chapter
8).
enforced into the respective direction such that it becomes still harder for the agent to switch.
These internal opinions – also referred to as inflexibility (Martins and Galam, 2013) – may
polarize in the sense that two opposing camps of more and more inflexible or extreme supporters
of the different options emerge.
The mechanism this paper adds to the polarization literature is related to this last approach by
differentiating between an internal evaluation of different discrete options of opinion expression.
Like in persuasion models, opinions are reinforced by encountering agents with similar views,
but in our model this »reinforcement in agreement« is mediated by a very different psychological
process. Namely, reinforcement or respectively a weakening of support of their expressed view is
not obtained by a costly process of argument persuasion but rather by the positive (negative) ex-
perience that agreement (disagreement) brings about. Agents form their opinions on the basis of
the social feedback they obtain by expressing them. The learning scheme employed in the model
is in line with the psychological theory of Fazio et al. (2004) which views attitudes as evaluative
associations of varying strength mediated through positive and negative experience. Recent
neuro-physiological studies provide support for such evaluative mechanisms in social interaction
(Campbell-Meiklejohn et al., 2010; Ruff and Fehr, 2014, see concluding section). Moreover,
rooted in reinforcement learning our model is amenable to game–theoretic considerations which
has recently been proven very productive in relating agent-based models to an economic model
of inter-temporal optimization (Banisch and Olbrich, 2017). Here (in Section 5) we link to the
developed body of literature on games on networks (Jackson and Zenou, 2014, and references
therein) and derive analytical results for the stability of polarization.
3 Model Description
3.1 Theoretical Model
Suppose there are two opinions that agents can adopt and express. We denote these alternative
options as oi, i being an agent index, and set oi ∈ {−1, 1} for further convenience. In the opinion
model we put forth here, an agent (say i) is chosen at random and expresses his current opinion
oi to a randomly chosen neighbor j. That is, a first agent i is chosen uniformly from the set of
all agents and the second agent j is sampled out of the set of i’s neighbors. Agent i expresses
its opinion oi to agent j and this agent responds to i’s expression with approval or disapproval
(agreement or disagreement) depending on her current opinion oj .
We further assume that agents become more convinced of an opinion if it is approved by their
interaction partners and that their conviction in an expressed opinion is challenged if others
disagree. This is accounted for by two real-valued terms per agent – Qi(1) and Qi(−1) – that
capture how well the expression of 1 and −1 respectively is perceived by peers in an agent’s
social environment. That is, the Qi(o) represent an internal evaluation of the different options
based on the social response the agent obtains on expressing them. These values are updated as
Qi(o)←
{
(1− α)Qi(o) + αri : if o = expression
Qi(o) : else.
(1)
with
ri = oioj (2)
leading to a positive feedback for oi = oj and to a negative one if oi 6= oj . The parameter α
is referred to as learning rate (see below) and governs the magnitude of change. In the context
of social influence opinion dynamics α can be seen as a susceptibility of the agents to revise its
opinion evaluation on the basis of social feedback obtained on expressing it. If not otherwise
stated, it is set to α = 0.05 for the simulations performed in this paper.
On expressing their current opinion agents thus receive affirmative or non-confirming response
depending on the current opinion in their neighborhood. Agreement signals approval and leads to
a positive experience (ri = 1) by which the evaluation Qi(o) of the respective expressed opinion
increases. Conversely, a disconfirming response gives rise to a negative feedback (ri = −1) and
decreases the value associated to the respective opinion. We shall therefore interpret the values
Qi(o) as associated to the two opinions as a strength with which the respective view is supported
by i or likewise as i’s conviction regarding the two alternatives. In particular, in the case where
only two competing opinions may be expressed, the difference ∆Qi = Qi(1) − Qi(−1) can be
interpreted as a conviction that one opinion is more favorable. Consequently, we assume that
when asked to articulate their current opinion or to respond to such an articulation, agents
choose to express that option which he more strongly supports at the current time step. In
other words, oi = −1 if Qi(−1) > Qi(1) and oi = 1 if Qi(−1) < Qi(1) or, more generally:
oi = arg max
o
Qi(o). (3)
However, we assume that agents generally tend to follow (3) in their expression choice, but
deviate from this scheme with a small probability  = 0.1. The mathematical reason for this is
that we make sure, in this way, that both opinion options are tested by the agents so that both Q-
values are actualized from time to time; for this reason  is usually referred to as exploration rate.
On the other hand, exploration seems also plausible especially when the difference in conviction
is small4. Moreover, one may argue that the noise introduced by  accounts for certain issues that
might occur in communication such as misunderstanding or misinterpretation of an articulation.
Readers familiar with game theory and reinforcement learning will have realized that this model
set-up casts opinion dynamics as a game played repeatedly on a network in which agents learn
the best response by a simple form of independent Q-learning (Sutton and Barto, 1998; Busoniu
et al., 2008). In this context, opinion expression should be seen as an action that leads to a certain
reward r and the (state-less) Q-values associated to the two possible actions (i.e. oi ∈ {−1, 1})
are updated based on this reward signal. In fact, we will make use of this analogy in the sequel
to mathematically characterize a series of stylized situations that will be helpful to provide an
overall picture of the model behavior.
We also note that the model behavior is essentially determined by the way in which the reward
system is designed. In this basic model agents learn to avoid dissonance and play a coordination
game, but we envision that different more complex and possibly heterogeneous rewards are a
propelling ingredient that deserves further exploration. The main purpose of this paper, however,
is to introduce this type of opinion game in the context of opinion models and polarization
dynamics in particular, and to demonstrate that opinion polarization can result from very few
relatively mild basic assumptions:
1. agreement is positively, disagreement negatively experienced,
2. these experiences drive opinion conviction (∆Qi) and expression (oi),
3. the probability of interaction is structured.
While the first two assumptions are realized through rewards and the update scheme as specified
by (1) - (3), the third aspect is included in the model by an interaction network that determines
the probability with which pairs of agents engage in communication with one another. In order
to illustrate the model’s capability to generate stable bi-polarization in connected networks with
a direct or indirect path between all pairs of agents, we generate a random geometric network
4In fact, this would motivate the so-called softmax action selection (Sutton and Barto, 1998) which assigns
equal probability to the two options when there Q values are equal and gradually favors the option with larger
Q the more they differ. We have tested this alternative and found no qualitative impact on the behavior of the
model.
(Penrose, 2003; Dall and Christensen, 2002) to define the neighborhood structure. According
to that network model, N agents are assigned a random position in the unit plane (xi, yi) ∈
[0, 1] × [0, 1] and a link is established whenever the distance between two agents is below a
threshold r. Notice that the average degree of the network depends on both the number of
agents and the threshold r and can be approximated as piNr2 for large N (Penrose, 2003).
Consequently, the network density is proportional to pir2. A further question typically addressed
in the analysis of random graph models and of special interest to the present discussion concerns
the critical threshold rc above which a giant connected component is formed. In two dimensions,
this threshold has been found by Dall and Christensen (2002) to scale as rc = 4.52/N with the
system size. Notice finally that random geometric graphs are a special type of random graphs
that differ from the latter especially regarding clustering (Dall and Christensen, 2002).
This graph model is very simple, comes with only a single parameter and is well-suited for the
purpose of illustration as it naturally embeds into two dimensions. In fact, spatial random graphs
can be seen as an intermediate between the regular lattice and the classical Erdős-Rényi random
graph model which have both been used frequently in previous simulation studies. We do not
further specify what the similarity in the unit square accounts for but remark that besides spatial
proximity it may also mimic social proximity patterns as they come about due to homophily
regarding age, status or socio-economic situation (Lazarsfeld and Merton, 1954; McPherson et al.,
2001). Notice, again, that contrary to most existing models of opinion dynamics and especially
those that aim at explaining bi-polarization, our model comes without any assumption about
homophily regarding opinions. One of the main purposes of this paper is to show that static
patterns of interaction and influence as caricatured by random spatial networks are sufficient for
bi-polarization to emerge even if indirect influence patterns expand over the entire population.
3.2 Implementation Details
 
r = 0.175;  % distance threshold for random geometric graph
[linkList,pos] = spatialRandomGraph(N,r); % generate spatial random graph
 
alpha = 0.05; % learning rate
eps = 0.1; % exploration rate
 
Q = rand(N,2)−0.5; % random initial values in [−0.5,0.5] for both opinions
 
for step = 1:steps % iterate as long as indicated by steps
 
    a1 = randi(N);  % random choice of agent that expresses his opinion
    expression = (Q(a1,2) > Q(a1,1));   % expression (1 −> o = 1 | 0 −> o = −1)
    if(rand() < eps)
        expression = −(expression − 1); % exploration
    end;
 
    numN = linkList(a1,1);              % random choice of a responding agent
    a2 = linkList(a1,randi(numN)+1);    % out of the neighbors of a1    
    reaction = (Q(a2,2) > Q(a2,1));     % response opinion articulated by a2    
    
    reward = (expression*2−1) * (reaction*2−1); % agreement −> 1 | disagreement −> −1
 
    % update of Q−values for a1 considering what has been expressed
    Q(a1,expression+1) = (1−alpha)*Q(a1,expression+1) + alpha * reward;
                        
end;
 
Figure 1: Runable MatLab-Code of the model.
In order to facilitate the reproduction of results and give readers the possibility to make their
own explorations with the model, we provide all the details of the model in form of the two code
snippets shown in Figure 1 and 2. Noteworthy, the model is simple enough to be implemented in
a few lines in MatLab (R2013a for Mac) and is executable as it is presented (N and the number
of iterations steps have to be specified). Figure 1 presents the model initialization and the
function [linkList,pos] = spatialRandomGraph(N,r)
 
pos     = rand(N,2); % random positions in [0,1]x[0,1]
linkList = [];       % empty list for neighbors
 
% go through all possible pairs and check if linked
for a1 = 1:N
    linkList(a1,1) = 0;
    for a2 = 1:N
        % euklidean distance smaller than r (and a1 != a2)?
        dist = sqrt((pos(a1,1)−pos(a2,1))^2 + (pos(a1,2)−pos(a2,2))^2);
        if(ne(a1,a2)&&dist < r)
            % count number of neighbors in first element of linkList
            linkList(a1,1) = 1 + linkList(a1,1); 
            % add neighbor
            linkList(a1,linkList(a1,1)+1)=a2;
        end;
    end;
end;
 
end
 
Figure 2: Runable MatLab-Code of the random graph model.
iteration loop, Figure 2 the random geometric graph model. Notice that for the computation-
intensive experiments the model was also implemented in C++.
In addition, two online implementations of the model are available under
• www.universecity.de/demos/OpinionValuesSmall.html
• www.universecity.de/demos/OpinionValuesBig.html
The former is a model with N = 100 agents which is also described in the next section. The
latter is an implementation with N = 10000 agents where the network is not visualized for
performance reasons. Notice that running the models requires a Browser with WebGL support.
4 Model Behavior on Random Geometric Graphs
The aim of this section is to provide an intuition about the model behavior. We will look
in some detail on a realization of the model on a random geometric graph. We have used a
network parameter significantly above the critical value r > rc in order to generate a graph with
a single connected component to highlight that the social feedback model goes beyond social
influence models in its capability to generate stable opinion bi-polarization in connected graphs.
We will consider individual trajectories as well as some macroscopic indicators and show that
polarization patterns emerge in these networks.
4.1 Simulation Setting
As described above we generate a random spatial network to define the neighborhood structure
of the agents. N agents are assigned random position in the unit plane (xi, yi) ∈ [0, 1] × [0, 1]
and a link is established whenever the distance between two agents is below a threshold r. The
agent population is initialized by setting the initial values Qi(1), Qi(−1) at random according
to a uniform distribution within [0, 1]. This defines the initial opinions (i.e. what the agents
express at t = 0). Due to the initialization of the Q–values, on average, half of the population
will initially hold opinion 1 and the other half opinion −1.
The exemplary model realization discussed in this section is done with N = 100 agents. The
threshold for the random geometric graph model is r = 0.175 and the resulting network is shown
in Fig. 3. The learning rate is α = 0.05 and the exploration rate  = 0.1.
4.2 Macroscopic and Microscopic Dynamics
An example run of the model with N = 100 agents is shown in Fig. 3. It shows for 10000 simula-
tion steps the microscopic system configuration at times zero, 2500, 5000, 7500 and 10000 along
with different macroscopic observables that measure the amount of polarization in a population.
Just as polarization mechanisms, also the empirical characterization of polarization patterns is
recently receiving some attention and we refer to Bramson et al. (2016) for an accessible overview
of different measures and a conceptual discussion of the different aspects of polarization they
account for. For the purposes of this paper, we follow DiMaggio et al. (1996) in the definition of
polarization measures and define dispersion as the variance σ2 over the distribution of convictions
∆Qi = Qi(1)−Qi(−1) and bimodality by its kurtosis
κ =
1
N
N∑
i=1
(∆Qi −∆Q)4
σ4
− 3. (4)
Notice that the kurtosis is most often interpreted as a measure of outliers with κ = 0 for the
normal distribution. Borrowing the interpretation from DiMaggio et al. (1996)5, p. 694-696,
positive kurtosis indicates a very peaked consensus distribution whereas it becomes negative for
flat and even more so for bimodal distributions reaching κ = −2 in the two-peaked case. For the
sake of visualizing bimodality in the same interval as the other measures, Fig.3 therefore shows
bimodality transformed as (κ+ 2)/2 such that a value of zero indicates complete bimodularity
and a value of one no deviation from the normal distribution.
In addition to the measures used by DiMaggio et al. (1996), the polarization measure introduced
in Flache and Macy (2011) which we refer to as dissimilarity is shown. Dissimilarity is defined
as the standard deviation of the distribution of opinion distances between all pairs of agents
and is zero for consensus and one for the case of the equally sized groups at the extremes (Mäs
and Flache, 2013, p. 8). Moreover, the average opinion (fraction of agents that express oi = 1)
and the average strength of support (average over the absolute values of ∆Qi) within the two
different groups of supporters is shown over time.
Initially, due to the random initialization of values, approximately one half of the population
supports expression 1 and -1 is supported by the other half. Notice that these fractions do
not change a lot during this simulation run even if single agents do change their opinion. The
left-most network shows that supporters are initially distributed without a particular spatial
organization. The individual convictions ∆Qi accounting for the strength with which the re-
spective alternative is supported (size of the nodes in Fig. 3) is at a relatively low level for
both opinions. The initial average strength of support (dashed curves) – that is, the average
absolute value over convictions of supporters of 1 and -1 respectively – is around 0.4 for both
alternatives.6
The strength of support is decreasing during an initial period of alignment because due to the
random initial configuration agents meet on average with an equal number of agents from both
camps such that no opinion is clearly favored and the ∆Qi tend to zero. However, this initial
period results in a strong spatial organization into opinion regions that is clearly visible at step
2500. This spatial distribution of opinions remains rather stable in the subsequent steps. While
strength of support is still small for most agents at t = 2500 (approximately at the initial
level), some clusters have emerged in which one opinion is more strongly supported after 5000
steps. In particular, we observe two regions in which agents strongly support 1 (blue) which are
connected by a bend of agents that moderately support 1. We also observe two disconnected
5The reader is referred to their paper for some example distributions and the respective kurtosis values.
6Notice that the theoretically expected value of this measure is 1/3 if both Q-values are drawn from a uniform
distribution in [0, 1] and that the value of almost 0.4 is the outcome for the randomly drawn initial condition
used in this simulation.
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Figure 3: Time evolution of the model. The plot shows 10000 iterations for 100 agents (on aver-
age 100 expressions by each agent) along with the system state at t = 0, 2500, 5000, 7500, 10000.
The size of the nodes represents their support level and the color which opinion is favored. The
average opinion represents the fraction of agents that support 1 and the support strength is
the value difference averaged over the respective sets of supporters. In the definition of the
polarization dispersion and bimodality measures we follow DiMaggio et al. (1996).
clusters where -1 (red) is supported more and more strongly. However, decisive changes may
still occur at the interfaces between regions in which different opinions are supported and some
clusters may be invaded in a long transient. Despite support strength remaining smaller in those
areas, on average, support strength increases for both opinions.
This evolution is also captured by the different polarization measures. First, dispersion and
dissimilarity behave very similarly and show an initial decrease in polarization followed by a
steady increase once the opinion clusters have formed. Kurtosis – relating to the bimodality of
a distribution – behaves differently. Namely, there is an initial increase from a moderate value
towards a value close to one capturing the fact that the initially uniform distribution approaches
a normal one with the ∆Qi approaching zero during the very first period. The first peak in the
measure is therefore indicative of a considerable reduction in polarization. However, as with the
other measures, it indicates that polarization increases to the initial level after approximately
2500 steps (second network). It further decreases but, opposed to the other measures, the
bimodality indicator reaches a stable level at around 4000 to 5000 steps. Notice that the value
at which it settles is larger than zero. This is due to the fact that not all agents develop the
same extreme level of conviction but some (i.e. those at the interface between different opinion
regions) remain slightly less convinced. The saturation of the bimodality index at a low level
therefore indicates that from time four to five thousand on there is a low but constant number
of agents in an intermediate regime of conviction (cf. DiMaggio et al. (1996), p. 694).
To fully understand the dynamical behavior of the model, let us look at the temporal evolution
of some particular agents. In Fig. 4 the values Qi(1) (blue) and Qi(−1) (red) are shown for
three different agents. Events where the ranking of values changes so that another opinion will
be chosen in expression and response are highlighted by yellow stars. Aside from providing a
better intuition of typical agent behaviors under the social feedback dynamics, this close-up view
highlights the differences of the model with respect to continuous social influence models and
physics-inspired binary state models (see Section 2).
The first one (agent 29, located in the upper right corner of the networks in Fig. 3) starts in
a state where Q(1) > Q(−1) but both values are at a relatively high level. Initially, this agent
is surrounded by an equal number of blue and red agents which leads to an decrease in both
Q(1) and Q(−1) as the expected reward (local feedback) is zero in such a situation. However,
already at step 2500 (see second network in Fig. 3) the neighborhood of 29 has aligned to -1
(red) and from that time on the value Q(−1) increases steadily until it saturates at Q(−1) = 1
which is the expected social reward in an homogeneous surrounding. Moreover, Q(1) decreases
step by step as the result of negative feedback on expressing 1 due to the exploration probability
( = 0.1). Q(1) will eventually approach -1
This behavior is characteristic for many agents in the simulation without a too strong initial
preference. There is a initial phase of alignment in which a local consensus emerges – weakly
supported, at first – which, once established, leads to an reinforcement of the respective view.
Notice that agents with a strong or moderate initial support of red in that cluster do in fact
never change opinion. Their values both tend to zero as well but the positive reinforcement of
their initial preference begins before a change of ranking takes place.
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Figure 4: Time evolution of three selected individuals in the above example run. The plot shows
10000 (on average 100 expressions by each agent). The yellow stars represent opinion change
events where the values associated to the two alternatives change ranking.
Secondly, we consider agent 17 with a relatively strong initial preference for -1. Her neighborhood
remains unaligned for a rather long time and still is at step 5000. In other words, the agent
is located in the interface region between different opinion clusters that have emerged early in
the simulation. As shown in Fig. 3, the agent forms part of a small cluster (along with 62, 75,
76) that is only slowly »invaded« by the blue opinion. Around step 7000, however, most of her
neighbors express preference for opinion 1 which leads to a rapid increase of Q(1) in subsequent
steps.
Finally, another node at the interface between two opinion regions is considered, namely agent
69. With an initial preference for blue, this agent first aligns with the red cluster to which agent
29 belongs and learns to support this opinion rather strongly. However, as the neighboring
cluster around agent 17 aligns more and more on 1, expressing -1 yields a negative feedback
with higher probability and leads to an decrease of Q(−1). Consequently, in between step 6000
to 8000 agent 69 experiences a second period of opinion changes the result of which is a slight
preference of 1. It is likely that a weak to moderate preference for blue will be stable as the
agent is surrounded by 4 red and six blue agents. However, there may be chains of random
events that take the agent to temporarily supporting -1 again.
An important characteristic visible in this microscopic perspective is that agents do not imme-
diately adapt their expressed opinion as a response to interaction with unaligned peers. The
imitation process implemented in many physics-inspired models of binary opinion dynamics
is replaced by a continuous re-evaluation of the two options. Periods of »indecision« during
which individuals try different options alternate with periods during which agents show a clear
preference of one or the other opinion.
Yet, this continuous adaptation is different from continuous models for opinion dynamics where
an »average opinion« emerges within different network clusters. To the contrary, the social feed-
back mechanism produces polarization by reinforcement of the support assigned to an opinion
once a community is locally aligned. In other words, the contraction mechanism leading to
different opinion clusters in bounded confidence models (at least if the initial diversity is large
enough) is replaced by a mechanism that drives opinion clusters to a higher degree of polarization
(even if initial convictions are relatively close).
4.3 Global Connectivity and Consensus Probability
Previous work by Flache and Macy (2011) has started to address the effect of network density
and long-range ties on the polarization process generated by different microscopic assumptions.
In their paper a model with positive social influence and selection based on homophily has been
compared with a model where negative ties may form if opinions are too different and drive
opinions still further apart. While increased global connectivity due to the introduction of long-
range ties fosters integration and consensus in the former, it fosters polarization under the latter
assumptions.
In random geometric graphs, global connectivity is modulated by the distance threshold r. If the
radius r is very small – that is, below the critical threshold of rc = 4.52/N (Dall and Christensen,
2002) – the network consists of many disconnected components. As r increases above the critical
value (r > rc), a giant connected component forms and the network becomes globally connected.
In this experiment we aim to provide a more complete picture of the model behavior on random
geometric graphs by looking at its long-run behavior as a function of the radius r. For this
purpose, we consider the consensus probability (the fraction of realizations that end up with
all agents in the same opinion state) and compare it to the fraction of graph realizations that
consist of a single connected component. Notice that the latter is a very conservative measure
of global connectivity because it considers graphs with a single isolated node as not connected.
Fig. 5 shows this for three different system sizes of 100, 200 and 500 agents. Each data point is
obtained by averaging over 100 realizations of the model after 20000×N time steps.
The figure shows that polarization is very likely in a considerable range of networks in which
all agents influence one another through direct or indirect influence paths. There are three
different regimes. For very low connectivity, the networks consist of disconnected parts each
performing an independent social feedback process. This is the only regime where repeated
averaging (Abelson, 1964; Friedkin and Johnsen, 1990; Friedkin, 1999) would predict persistent
disagreement. In the second regime, starting with an r that decreases with the system size, the
probability that the graph is connected sharply increases. Notice that this transition takes place
at values well above rc due to the fact that the probability of a single connected component is
sensitive to single isolated nodes. The consensus probability, on the other hand, only gradually
increases and reaches one at a level of connectivity that is considerably higher compared to the
level at which a single connected component becomes certain. This means that in this region
of the parameter space a large proportion of model realizations converges to polarized situation
despite the fact that there is an influence path between all pairs of agents. This observation
becomes more pronounced when the number of agents increases. For N = 500 and r from 0.1
to 0.15, for instance, almost all realizations lead to a connected graph and a polarizing opinion
formation process on it. The inset of Fig. 5 illustrates this by multiplying the probability
of polarization and that of a single connected component. Finally, as r grows very large, the
resulting networks become rather dense, less and less modular in terms of spatially divided
subgroups, and consensus (all agents maximally support the same opinion) becomes the most
likely outcome of the model.
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Figure 5: Probability of consensus (all agents maximally support the same opinion) and of a
single connected component as a function of the distance threshold r governing global connec-
tivity. The inset shows the respective likeliness that a graph with single connected component
is generated and polarization observed on it.
In order to show that the spatial organization into relatively (but not completely) segregated
communities of agents (see the networks in Fig. 3) is decisive for polarization to emerge, Fig.
6 reprints the results for N = 200 and compares them to an Erdős–Rényi random graph of
the same size, that is, a graph without any spatial organization. Notice that the probabilities
are shown as a function of network density in order to compare the two models. While the
probability of consensus remains low compared to the probability of a single component in the
spatial random graph model, both behave very similar in the Erdős–Rényi model. That is, in
the Erdős–Rényi graph we observe consensus whenever there is a single connected component.7
This indicates that the spatial organization into several communities of agents that influence
one another and interact less frequently with other groups is decisive for polarization to emerge
under the social feedback process developed in the paper. It points at the community structure
of a network as the most important factor to explain polarization in the context of our model. In
the remainder of this paper, we will support this interpretation by game-theoretic considerations.
5 Mathematical Characterizations
By treating opinion expression as an action and the social feedback as the payoff that an expres-
sion receives the proposed opinion model is strongly rooted in a form of reinforcement learning
known as Q-learning (Sutton and Barto, 1998; Busoniu et al., 2008). One of the interesting
properties of this learning scheme is that its estimates of the value of different actions converge
to the true expected utilities under certain conditions. The model proposed in this paper can
be seen as a repeated stochastic game played on a network, and therefore its rootedness in Q-
learning provides a productive connection to previous work on games on networks (see Jackson
and Zenou (2014) and references therein).
In fact, coordination games – as specified by our reward function (2) – have received particular
attention and structural conditions for the stability of non-consensus configurations have been
7Notice that the consensus probability is even slightly higher than the probability of a connected graph. The
reason for this is that agents in different disconnected components may end up supporting the same opinion with
a relatively high probability. For instance, in a random graph with two components and two opinions all agents
converge to the same opinion in one half of the cases.
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Figure 6: Comparison of the random geometric graph (green) and the Erdős–Rényi random
graph (black) for N = 200. Probability of consensus (all agents maximally support the same
opinion) and a single connected component as a function of the network density.
identified (Morris, 2000). These conditions are based on a notion of cohesion introduced in
Wasserman and Faust (1994) and basically state that at least two subgroups with more in-group
than out-group connections must exist in a network to allow for an equilibrium in which different
actions may survive.
In the context of our model, the existence of multiple cohesive groups leads to group polarization
processes that may take different directions within the different groups. Using game-theoretic
arguments, in this section, we show that the model leads to such a group polarization process in
densely connected groups and that structural holes prevent a single opinion to spread over the
entire network. We use simulations to establish the relevance of these theoretical results for our
model. Moreover, we show that the interplay of these two essential properties leads to opinion
bi-polarization in the social feedback model introduced in this paper.
5.1 Decision Problem from the Individual Perspective
Let us first look at a single agent in a fixed environment. Assume therefore that a single agent
i is surrounded k neighbors and denote by
oN (i) =
1
k
∑
j∈N (i)
oj (5)
as the average expressed opinion in i’s neighborhood N (i). The expected reward i obtains on
expressing 1 is then given by oN (i) and expressing −1 yields −oN (i) on average. Consequently,
using these expectations, the update of the values Qi(1) and Qi(−1) is given by
Qt+1i (1) = Q
t
i(1) + Pr(o
t
i = 1)α(oN (i) −Qti(1))
Qt+1i (−1) = Qti(−1) + Pr(oti = −1)α(−oN (i) −Qti(−1))
(6)
where Pr(oti = o) are the probabilities that i performs the respective action (expresses 1 or −1)
at time t. In the model this depends on the current value of Qti(1) and Q
t
i(−1), but we just
notice that if we allow for exploration ( > 0, whatever small) these probabilities are strictly
positive. Under this assumption, therefore, the fixed point of (6) is given by Q∗i (1) = oN (i) and
Q∗i (−1) = −oN (i) and the respective value difference by ∆Q∗i = 2oN (i).
Therefore, if an individual is in a homogeneous environment with all neighbors in the same state
(i.e., oN (i) = 1 or −1) i’s conviction settles at a maximal value in compliance with neighbors
whatever i’s initial assignment of values has been. That is, i becomes maximally convinced of
the respective opinion. Noteworthy, as only the expressed opinions of neighbors are visible to i
this occurs even if neighbors are only weakly supportive of that view. Hence, in a homogeneous
environment the model gives rise to a radicalization process by which weakly convinced members
approach maximal conviction irrespective of the initial conviction in the neighborhood.
In this sense, the model captures a dynamical process of group polarization by which a group
initially inclined into an attitudinal direction delivers a more extreme judgement after discussion
(see Sunstein (2002) and references therein as well as Lord et al. (1979) on biased assimilation).
Contrary to the limited argument pool or biased processing argument, however, our model
reveals a social influence route to polarization where agents explore the social acceptability of
their opinion and conviction is strengthened in the absence of opposing voices.
5.2 Gate Keeping at Structural Holes
A B
Figure 7: Interaction of two agents
A and B who are each linked to an
opinion community of different sign.
Real social networks are not complete. They are rather
sparse and exhibit complex structure. They tend to come
in clusters of tightly connected groups within which in-
formation flows rapidly, but across which influence and
information flow is reduced. Ties connecting different
clusters (along with the respective nodes) have received
particular attention in social network analysis (Burt,
2004; Borgatti et al., 2009) due to their gate keeping role
and strategic position which may come as a competitive
advantage in terms of access to information, but also
as a challenge to maintain connections with conflicting
groups.
In the context of opinion dynamics, it is important to
understand whether and at what pace opinions spread across different communities. For this
purpose, let us consider the interaction of two agents A and B both connected to a different
community homogeneously supporting different opinions (see Fig. 7). Notice that this is the
paradigmatic example of a bridge as considered in Burt (2004). Let us denote by kA the num-
ber of neighbors of A and by kB the number of neighbors of B respectively. Assume that the
opinion in A’s community is -1 (oN (A)\B = −1) and that B’s community adheres to opinion 1
(oN (B)\A = 1). We leave the respective support levels in the two communities unspecified and
only look at the best choices for A and B. From the point of view of an interaction between A and
B we can render such a situation as a game with the following bi-matrix for the single shot game:
−1 1
−1 (1, 1−kBkB+1) (
kA−1
kA+1
, kB−1kB+1)
1 (−1,−1) (1−kAkA+1 , 1)
It is immediately clear that as soon as the size of the communities linked to A and B respectively
exceeds one, the Nash equilibrium of the game is given by (o∗A = −1, o∗B = 1) such that both
agents maintain the opinion of their respective group. This shows that different opinion clusters
are a stable outcome of the opinion formation process on clustered interaction networks such as
those considered in the previous section.
In order to show that the game shown in the game matrix above can provide a valid approxi-
mation for the proposed social feedback model, let us briefly consider the relation between the
above payoff matrix and the dynamics (1) of our model. Therefore, assume that agent B forms a
community with just two other agents (kB = 2) and agent A is part of a bigger community with
ten others (kA = 10) and that A’s community is in favor of −1 and B’s community supports 1.
Consequently, the theoretical payoffs for A are piA(1) = −9/11 and piA(−1) = 9/11 and for B
piB(1) = 1/3 and piB(−1) = −1/3. Fig. 8 shows the evolution of the four values Qi(oi) along
with the payoffs as specified above (l.h.s.) and the resulting differences ∆Qi and ∆pii (r.h.s.).
The agents A and B are initialized such that they strongly disagree with their respective group.
However, both quickly approach the game payoff values such that, in effect, they learn to play
the associated opinion game.
0 100 200 300 400 500 600 700 800 900 1000−1
−0.8
−0.6
−0.4
−0.2
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
time (every 10th step)
Q i
(o
i)
 
 
QB(−1)
QB(1)
QA(−1)
QA(1)
/B(1)
/B(−1)
/A(−1)
/A(1)
0 100 200 300 400 500 600 700 800 900 1000−1
−0.5
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
time (every 10th step)
6
 Q
i
 
 
6QB
6QA
6/A
6/B
Figure 8: Dynamical evolution of two agents A and B each linked to a fixed community of
opposed sign. A is connected to kA = 10 agents supporting -1, B to kB = 2 agents supporting
1. A learning rate α = 0.02 and exploration rate  = 0.1 is used. The figure shows a quick
convergence of the Q-values to the payoffs of the associated opinion game.
5.3 Opinion Games and Cohesive Sets
The previous analysis points out the relevance of game-theoretic arguments for the analysis of
the convergence behavior of the proposed model and the identification of conditions for the emer-
gence of polarization. Coordination games and games of strategic complements more generally
have received particular attention in the literature on games on networks (Morris, 2000; Jack-
son, 2010; Jackson and Zenou, 2014). From this perspective, our model belongs to the category
of semi-anonymous games (Jackson, 2010) in which only the number of neighbors taking the
different actions (expressing their opinion) plays a role regarding the best response of a player
and not the specific interaction partners. In other words, players assign equal importance to all
of their local neighbors.
In the context of this type of games, a particular notion of group cohesion (Wasserman and Faust,
1994) has proven an effective tool to characterize structural conditions for contagious spreading
of one action to the entire population and conversely also for the stable coexistence of both
alternatives in the population (Morris, 2000). Given a network along with a pay-off structure
such as given with (2), the challenge is to identify action configurations over the network that
are stable in the game-theoretic sense. That is, configurations where no player independently
would be better off by switching to the other alternative. Notice that in our model, a players
expression oi is a best response choice if at least half of its neighbors favor that opinion as
well. Cohesion measured as »the relative frequency of ties among group members compared
to non-members« (Morris, 2000, p. 64) is therefore a direct way to check whether a group of
agents plays at equilibrium. Namely, given a group S of agents such that each member has
more connections to agents in S than to others (in the complementary set S¯), then this group
plays at equilibrium whenever all members choose the same action. In consequence, whenever
there are at least two distinct groups with cohesion greater or equal to 1/2 (more in-group then
out-group links) in a network, configurations in which different opinions are expressed in the
different groups are stable.8
More formally and following Morris (2000), let us define the fraction of neighbors of agent i that
are also in S as
pi(S|i) = ∑
j∈S
aij/
N∑
j=1
aij, (7)
where aij are the elements of the adjacency matrix. The cohesion of the entire group S of agents
is then defined as the smallest value pi(S|i) of all the individuals in S, that is
coh(S) = min
i∈S
pi(S|i). (8)
As mentioned above, the reward system (2) used in this paper corresponds to a symmetric
coordination game for which the relevant cohesiveness level is 1/2. For the stability of a non-
consensus configuration it is necessary that there is at least one partition of the network into S
and its complement S¯ such that both S and S¯ are at least 1/2-cohesive. The intuition behind
that is relatively simple. If, for example, coh(S) < 1/2 this means that there is at least one agent
i ∈ S that has more neighbors in S¯ than in S. Therefore, if one opinion (say 1) is expressed
in S and the other (−1) in S¯, agent i would improve its expected pay-off by switching to −1
destroying the group consensus in S. As other agents in S are connected to i its switching may
potentially lead to a cascade of further opinion changes by other members of the group S and,
depending on the connectivity structure, global alignment on expressing −1 may result.
Let us finally illustrate the cohesion concept by a brief look at the example from the previous
section where two agents are connected to different communities. It is easy to compute that
A’s community SA with |SA| = 11 is 10/11-cohesive because A has 11 neighbors 10 of which
are in SA and the rest of the agents is only connected to A leading to a cohesion value of
one. Respectively, SB with |SB| = 3 is 2/3 cohesive because B has three neighbors and two
of them in SB. Hence, the cohesion condition is satisfied for both subsets (coh(SA) > 1/2 and
coh(SB) > 1/2) and consequently the polarized outcome is stable.
5.4 Cohesion in Two-Community Graphs
Let us generalize this example and consider the case of two communities with M and L agents
where we assume that most connections are within and only a few across the two communities.
Let p denote the probability of an (undirected) inter-community link between an agent in SM
and an agent in SL and (1 − p) the probability for intra-community connections. The obvious
advantage of this graph model is that we (externally) define a partition of the network for which
we may study how the stability of the non-consensus configurations is affected as p increases.
Meanwhile this setting can be seen as a prototypic situation that occurs also in more complex
social networks.
In fact, there is a long tradition in studying the two-community topology in population genetics
(Wright, 1943) and also theoretical work on opinion dynamics has relied on this as a stylized
description of segregated communication structures (Dandekar et al., 2013; Banisch, 2014a;
Lamarche-Perrin et al., 2016). One could think of it in spatial terms such as, for instance, as
a set of villages with intensive interaction among people of the same village and some contact
across, but it could also be related to homophily regarding to social classes, ethnicity, religious
8Cf. (Morris, 2000, Prop. 5) and (Jackson and Zenou, 2014, Prop. 3.3).
communities, etc. Fig. 9 shows a small realization of such a two-community setting. There
are 7 nodes in each community and three links that connect agents from different groups. The
numbers shown on the nodes represent the individual ratios pi(S|i) given that partition. In this
case, these values give rise to a cohesion of coh(S) = mini∈S pi(S|i) = 2/3 for both subgroups
rendering a bi-polar situation where two competing view coexist as stable.
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Figure 9: A small two-community graph with two densely connected components and a few
»long-range« ties connecting them. The fractional numbers shown on the nodes correspond to
the respective fraction of neighbors with the same opinion pi(S|i).
The ratio pi of an agent in (say) community SM is given by
pi(SM |i) =
∑
j∈SM
aij/
N∑
j∈SM∪SL
aij = mi/mi+li (9)
where mi (li) is used as a shorthand for the number of links that i maintains to agents in SM
(SL). Given that links are independently created with probability p and 1− p respectively, each
row of the adjacency matrix can be seen as the result of a finite sequence of Bernoulli trails.
Consequently, for an agent i ∈ SM the probability Prin(m) that exactly m links to agents in the
same community are created is given by
Pr
in
(m) = (1− p)mpM−1−m
(
M − 1
m
)
(10)
where M − 1 corresponds to the number of potential within-community links excluding self-
connections. The probability of exactly l across-community connections Prout(l) reads
Pr
out
(l) = pl(1− p)L−l
(
L
l
)
. (11)
Configurations where different opinions are expressed in the different communities loose their
stability if mi < li for at least one agent i, because 1/2-cohesion of the entire community rests
upon 1/2-cohesiveness of each individual with respect to the group (8). For each single agent in
SM the probability that (s)he is less than 1/2-cohesive is given by
Pr(m < l) =
M−1∑
m=0
Pr
in
(m)
L∑
l=m+1
Pr
out
(l) = qM . (12)
For convenience we denote this probability as qM . Likewise, the probability to be less than
1/2-cohesive for an agent in SL (denoted by qL) is obtained by exchanging m with l andM with
L respectively:
Pr(l < m) =
L−1∑
l=0
Pr
in
(l)
M∑
m=l+1
Pr
out
(m) = qL. (13)
For a network consisting ofM+L agents, the probability that there is no agent for whichmi < li
can be obtained by a similar reasoning conceiving the problem as a sequence of M +L Bernoulli
trails with probabilities qM and qL respectively. Following this argument, the probability that
no agent in SM is less than 1/2-cohesive is given by (1 − qM )M and for SL it reads (1 − qL)L.
Therefore, the probability that the partitions SM and SL both satisfy the cohesion condition for
the stability of different actions in the different communities is given by
Pr[coh(SM ) ≥ 1/2 ∧ coh(SL) ≥ 1/2] = (1− qM )M (1− qL)L. (14)
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Figure 10: Probability that both communities are at least 1/2 cohesive as a function of p. The
figure compares the theoretical results (14) with an average over 100 network realizations.
Fig. 10 compares the theoretical probability (14) that both communities are at least 1/2-cohesive
with an average over 100 network realizations and demonstrates the correctness of the previous
calculations. It shows four symmetric (M = L, solid stars) and two asymmetric cases (M 6= L,
dashed circles), but we shall focus on the symmetric ones here. In the cases where M = L
we observe that the rewiring probability p at which the transition from stability to instability
occurs increases with the number of agents in the communities. At the same time it becomes
sharper with increasing size which indicates a discontinuous phase transition in the limit of an
infinite system. In fact, it is easy to see that when M → ∞, L → ∞ and M = L the fraction
of intra- and inter-community links is precisely (1− p) such that the critical value at which the
communities loose 1/2-cohesion is precisely p∗ = 1/2.
The combinatorial analysis of cohesion hence predicts a phase transition from stable bi-polarization
to consensus on the two island graph which becomes sharper with increasing system size. In or-
der to assess the significance of this result for the convergence behavior of the model, we initialize
the two–island system in a state of maximal polarization and check if polarization persists under
the opinion reinforcement mechanism. That is, we initialize agents in community SM with a high
support for opinion −1 by setting Q0i∈SM (−1) = 1 and Q0i∈SM (1) = −1 such that ∆Q0i∈SM = −2
and agents in the other community just the opposite such that ∆Q0i∈SL = 2. For different p, the
system is then iterated for a relatively long period of 20000 × N steps (N = M + L) and we
compute the fraction of realizations out of 100 that reached consensus at that time. Consensus
(i.e. all agents express either 1 or −1) is a suitable indicator because once reached the respec-
tive opinion is globally reinforced and the probability that one agent reverses due to finite-size
fluctuations is effectively zero. In a first experiment the community sizes are varied from 10 to
500 (Fig. 11, l.h.s) and the learning rate is set to α = 0.01. In a second experiment the size is
fixed to M = L = 50 and the influence of the learning rate α is analyzed (reported on the r.h.s
of Fig. 11).
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Figure 11: Probability of persistent polarization in a suite of 100 simulations per data point
(inter-community coupling p) is compared to the 1/2-cohesion probability as computed by (14).
On the l.h.s. the comparison is shown for various community sizes from 10 to 500 with a fixed
learning rate α = 0.01. On the r.h.s. the influence of the learning rate is studied for a system of
fixed size M = L = 50.
The l.h.s of Fig. 11 shows the results of this experiment for different system sizes and compares
them to the theoretical 1/2-cohesion probability (14). All in all, a relatively good agreement be-
tween the simulations and the theoretical curves is observed which shows that the combinatorial
analysis of group cohesion provides an accurate prediction for the persistence of polarization in
the two-community scenario. However, there are two effects that the cohesion probability does
not properly account for. First, for the large system with M = L = 500 the transition from
stable polarization to consensus takes place at a lower value of p compared to the theoretical
curve. Second, the transition observed for the model dynamics is generally sharper than the
theoretical prediction. In fact, the transition is rather sharp already for a relatively small system
of 100 agents.
The r.h.s of Fig. 11 – looking at the influence of the learning rate α – sheds some light on both
deviations. First, regarding the lower critical value for large systems it becomes clear that the
learning rate must be small enough to match with the theoretical transition point. For a system
of 100 agents a learning rate of α = 0.05 still leads to a transition from polarization to consensus
at a significantly lower value of inter-community coupling whereas with α < 0.01 the theoretical
curve is approached well. As the learning rate governs the fluctuations of the Q-values, these
results suggest that the closer the community graph is to a group cohesion of 1/2, the more likely
it becomes that one community is invaded due to a sequence of out-group interactions by which
agents in one community occasionally express the opinion of the other enabling that opinion
to spread throughout the entire cluster. The probability of such a cascading invasion increases
with the size of the system so that the theoretical curves are matched only if the learning rate
(and hence the fluctuations in the Qi) is reduced.
Cohesion is a structural measure which characterizes stable network configurations in the fol-
lowing sense: given the configuration of all players’ actions no agent alone can improve its payoff
by switching to the opposed action. It thus assumes that all players know their best response
and play accordingly. In the opinion model, however, agents learn which opinion is favored in
their local environment, and they do so in a sequential manner receiving feedback only from one
peer at a time. This means that they may deviate from »best response behavior« from time to
time due to imperfect estimates Q of their expected reward. A perfect matching can thus be
observed only in the limit α→ 0.
The second observation that the transition is generally sharper under learning dynamics has
two distinct reasons. On the one hand, notice in Fig. 11 (r.h.s.) that the match between
theory and simulations becomes fairly accurate in the lower part (p > 0.39) of the curve with
decreasing α (see brown stars for α = 0.0001). In this parameter regime where cohesion is
generally very close to 1/2 a finite learning rate α > 0 may lead to a cascade triggered by
fluctuations in the Qi as described above. On the other hand, for p < 0.39 we notice a higher
probability of persistent opinion polarization – even increasing with decreasing α – which points
at an aspect the cohesion probability (14) does not account for. The reason for this is that
the theoretical probability (14) is computed by fixing the network partition to SM and SL. In
the random assignment of connections, it may, however, happen that a single node becomes
relatively disconnected from its predefined set and at the same time cohesively connected to
the other set. While (14) would predict a loss of cohesion of SM or SL the entire network still
possesses two cohesive sets (slightly different from SM and SL) on which different opinion are
stably expressed.
6 Conclusion
This paper makes the following main contributions:
1. It develops a new mechanism for the emergence and persistence of opinion bi-polarization
which is based on a parsimonious set of assumptions. As opposed to previous models
aiming at an explanation of bimodal opinion distributions, the proposed social feedback
model does not rely on negative social influence (Mark, 2003; Macy et al., 2003; Baldassarri
and Bearman, 2007; Flache and Macy, 2011) or assumptions about opinion homophily or
bounded confidence (Axelrod, 1997; Deffuant et al., 2000; Hegselmann et al., 2002; Mäs
and Flache, 2013; Duggins, 2017). It discriminates an internal conviction and an exter-
nally expressed opinion by a learning process which reinforces an agents private conviction
in its expressed opinion based on the rewarding or non-rewarding experiences made by
communicating ones views in a social neighborhood. In large social networks that consist
of different communities this social feedback mechanism gives rise to group polarization
processes by which members of the same community become collectively more convinced
of one opinion. This process plays out independently in different communities even if weak
ties and individual links are maintained across the different groups because the rewards
gained by adopting and expressing the group opinion is larger than the rewards attainable
in less frequent interactions with the out-group. As a consequence, for two connected in-
dividuals that are members of different groups it is desirable to maintain their respective
group opinion because the rewarding experiences from communication within their group
outweigh the negative experiences of disagreement when they occasionally encounter.
2. The paper introduces reinforcement learning to opinion dynamics modeling. While rein-
forcement learning as a basic model of social behavior is not new and is, for instance, at the
core of Homans’ work on social exchange theory (Homans, 1958, 1974), its application and
interpretation as a model for opinion dynamics and polarization in particular is. In our
model, we consider that opinion expression is a decision problem that involves an internal
evaluation of the expected effect of available expression alternatives based on the social
feedback these expressions previously received. Rejection and confirmation of expressed
opinions by peers lead to a re-evaluation of the different options which is mediated via a
reward signal. This mechanism leads to the formation of strong convictions in an opinion
– that is, a clear evaluation that one opinion is preferred over the other – based on how
acceptable it is to advocate that standpoint in a social neighborhood. It is noteworthy
that studies in neurobiology suggest that »social influence mediates very basic value sig-
nals in known reinforcement circuity« (Campbell-Meiklejohn et al., 2010). However, while
neurobiology posits that the »rewarding properties of social behavior may have evolved
to facilitate group cohesion and cooperation« (Ruff and Fehr, 2014), our model suggests
that polarization (as opposed to cohesion) across groups may be a side-effect of these re-
warding properties. In other words, human ability to coordinate with in-groups comes at
the expense of a likely alienation to out-groups, which we could refer to as a »tragedy of
coordination«.
3. Through the use of reinforcement learning, the paper establishes a link between models
of opinion formation and standard game-theoretic notions of equilibrium and explores its
usefulness in the analysis of the convergence behavior of the model. A particular advantage
of social influence network theory (French Jr, 1956; Abelson, 1964; Friedkin and Johnsen,
1990; Friedkin, 1999; Friedkin et al., 2016; Parsegov et al., 2017) is analytical tractability
Some extensions of the theory prompted by the polarization problem introduce a non-
linearity that is difficult to handle with analytical tools (Hegselmann et al., 2002). The
model we put forth can also be seen as a non-linear extension to these models which, while
being plausible and psychologically well-justified, provides a powerful tool to establish the
connection to game-theory and well-established equilibrium concepts. Namely, by the Q-
learning scheme adopted to operationalize the opinion formation process agents learn to
associate values to the different opinion expressions that converge to the payoffs of the
corresponding »opinion game«. This has been shown and used throughout Section 5. The
theory of games on networks in particular (Morris, 2000; Jackson and Zenou, 2014) has
proven useful to establish conditions under which persistent disagreement can be expected
by the mechanism proposed in this paper.
4. In that context, the notion of cohesive sets (Morris, 2000) has been shown to provide a
useful structural measure for the characterization of network conditions for polarization.
In particular, the paper shows that a bimodal distribution of opinions is a stable outcome
of the social feedback model of opinion dynamics whenever at least two communities exist
in a network with more connection within than across groups. In such a situation the
reinforcement mechanism gives rise to a group polarization process that may take different
directions within the different groups. That is, the cohesive structure of a network is deci-
sive for bi-polarization in the context of our model and the effect of different connectivity
patterns on the model dynamics (such as, for instance, long-range ties, Centola and Macy
(2007); Flache and Macy (2011)) consequently becomes a question of whether the cohesive
structure of the network undergoes a qualitative change or not.
5. In this sense, our model shows that persistent, even increasing polarization may be ob-
tained despite a significant exposure to attitude-challenging content (Bakshy et al., 2015).
Moderate levels of homophily and network segregation are sufficient for opinion polariza-
tion.
This paper paves the way for quite a few interesting topics to be addressed by future research.
For instance, the model can be seen as an abstraction of recently proposed persuasion mod-
els of polarization in which opinion–confirming interactions reinforce commitment to that view
whereas disconfirming interaction weakens opinion support due to biased argument processing
(Dandekar et al., 2013) or biased argument pools (Sunstein, 2002; Mäs and Flache, 2013). On
the other hand, the model is based on a more simple reinforcement procedure which does not
assume any more complex kind of argument processing on the side of the agents but instead
conceives opinion evaluation and consolidation as the result of positive and negative experiences
that are assumingly related to agreement and disagreement with peers. Despite these different
interpretations, the collective dynamics of our social feedback model and the argument persua-
sion model proposed in Mäs and Flache (2013) share certain similarities. In fact, we conjecture
that the incorporation of an opinion homophily mechanism at the level of convictions in our
model would be compatible with the homophily concept employed in the model by Mäs and
Flache (2013) and that the learning rate of the reinforcement scheme used in this paper can be
adjusted to the impact that the adoption of a new argument has in their model.
Second, the random geometric graph model used in the first part of the paper has mainly been
chosen to illustrate the possibility of stable bi-polarization in a connected graph. On the other
hand, the main purpose of the two–community setting used in Section 5 has been to show
that the game-theoretic characterization of non-consensus equilibria in terms of cohesive sets
provides a valid characterization for the opinion model as well. Future work should explore more
complex and more realistic social networks. In particular, our analysis points at the relevance
of community structure of a graph which, in network science, is typically captured by measures
of modularity (Girvan and Newman, 2002; Fortunato, 2010). Future work should clarify on
mathematical grounds the relation between the notion of cohesion as used in the game–theoretic
literature and different conceptions of modularity with the respective approaches to community
detection. In addition, we envision that the proposed model is actually well–suited as a tool for
community detection and the identification of structural holes in real social networks.
Real social networks are not static but evolve in time and may undergo structural changes. A
natural model extension is therefore to provide agents with the possibility to search for new
interaction partners if their opinion deviates from the opinion in their current neighborhood. In
the framework of reinforcement learning that we propose this can be incorporated in different
ways. For instance, given their current opinion agents could learn the rewards they can expect
from each other agent in the population and base their decisions of whom to interact with on
that evaluation. In the current setting of binary opinions this would either lead to consensus
with all agents strongly supporting one opinion or to a complete bi-separation of the network
into two groups strongly supporting different views. Other outcomes can be achieved by making
network changes costly (Bojanowski and Buskens, 2011).
On the whole, we believe that linking opinion dynamics with social feedback mechanisms bears
great potential for modeling opinion formation processes in different social settings and the model
presented here should be understood as an initial implementation of this paradigm. The theory
of reinforcement learning in which different behavioral options (opinion expressions in our case)
are constantly re-evaluated based on the rewards they give in a certain environment provides
a theoretically convenient and very general framework to address a wide variety of questions
that are relevant in the science of opinion dynamics. Most notably, it shifts the explanatory
focus from mechanism of social influence and opinion exchange to the incentives and rewards
of opinion expression in different social settings which is becoming more and more germane to
understanding opinion exchange processes in social media platforms.
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